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JURISDICTION 
Fire Insurance Exchange ("Fire") agrees with the jurisdictional statement provided 
by Randy Birch ("Birch"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Where (a) an insurer ("Fire") has paid, minus the insured's ("Birch") $500 
deductible, the full replacement value of damaged property without depreciation, and (b) 
Fire has recovered through subrogation the replacement value minus depreciation from 
the tortfeasor's insurer, and (c) Fire has partially reimbursed all but $25.00 of Birch's 
deductible from the subrogation recovery: 
1. To be "made whole," is Birch entitled to reimbursement of 
the $25.00 that would make Birch's total recovery (from insurance and 
subrogation reimbursement) greater than his full tort recovery, i.e., the 
depreciated value of the property? 
2. Is Birch entitled to allocate to the deductible portion of the 
loss a more than proportionate share of the tort recovery? 
These issues were preserved on appeal by briefing and argument to the District Court. R. 
38-63; R. 81-97; R. 101-106; R. 148 *p. 1 -32. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Fire agrees with Birch that this Court's standard of review is de novo. Ahlstrom v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4; 73 P.3d 315. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
None. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by Birch to recover from Fire, Birch's homeowner's insurer, 
additional reimbursement of Birch's deductible for replacement of a fire-damaged fence, 
after Fire made a subrogation recovery from the tortfeasor's insurer. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Birch filed a complaint, which Fire answered. Contending that the answer 
admitted facts sufficient to establish his right to recover, Birch moved for judgment on 
the pleadings. At argument on that motion, the parties orally stipulated to certain facts, 
allowing the district court to convert the motion to one for summary judgment. (Birch's 
brief ignores the oral stipulation.) The court granted summary judgment in favor of Fire 
and against Birch and rendered judgment that Birch recover nothing. 
C. UNDISPUTED FACTS RELEVANT ON APPEAL 
Some neighborhood children were playing with matches and started a fire to the 
southwest of Birch's property. The fire spread and damaged Birch's fence and 
landscaping. The fire was extinguished by a passing plane that dropped fire retardant on 
the area. The fire retardant contained a red dye that stained the fence, shed house, and 
ground in the immediate vicinity.1 
Birch's policy with Fire provided coverage for the full replacement cost of 
damaged property, without deduction for depreciation, but subject to a $500 deductible.2 
1
 This paragraph is a verbatim quote (omitting citations) from Birch Br. 2. 
2
 Birch Br. 2 citing R. 40-42. 
2 
Birch and Fire agreed that the replacement cost of the damaged property was 
$7,732.91.3 Fire paid this amount, less Birch's $500 deductible, or $7,232.91.4 Fire then 
sought recovery from the homeowner's insurer for some of the children who had started 
the fire.5 
As a subrogee, Fire stood in Birch's shoes and could recover only the damages 
allowed by Utah tort law.6 Tort law only allows recovery for the actual value of the 
property before the loss, a value that reflects any depreciation suffered by that property 
due to age, wear, or other factors.7 
The Parties stipulated that Fire settled with the responsible parties' insurer for 95% 
of the amount it had paid Birch, or $7,346.26.8 The Parties stipulated that the 5% 
3
 Birch Br. 2. 
4
 Birch Br. 2. 
5
 Birch Br. 2; citing R. at 41,17 (Mem. In Supp. Of Pi's. Mot. Part. Judg. On Pleadings). 
6
 Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc., 2002 UT 62, f 23, 52 P.3d 1179,1186 ("In 
asserting any purported subrogation right against the third party, the insurer can be 
'subrogated to only such rights as the insured possesses,' because the insurer, as 
subrogee, 'steps into the shoes' of the insured." (citations omitted)); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1996). 
7
 "In case of any injury of a permanent nature to real property, the proper measure of 
damages is the diminution in the market value of the property by reason of that injury, or 
in other words, the difference between the value of the land before the injury and its 
value after the injury." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 404 (1988). Further the original 
"...cost, less an allowance for depreciation from age, usage, and other like causes, is a 
fair criterion of present value." 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 959 (1988). 
8
 Dist. Ct. Minute Entry 2, R. 12-123; Arg. Tr. 28-29; R. 49. Birch argues that Fire failed 
to produce documentation of the settlement amount. (Birch Br. 2 n.2.) He ignores the 
stipulation, which made such documentation unnecessary. 
3 
reduction reflected the depreciation of the damaged property as compared with the new 
property that replaced it.9 The Parties further stipulated that the settlement as to the 
amount recoverable was reasonable.10 
Fire paid Birch $475.00, 95% of his deductible.11 As a result, Birch had received 
payments totaling $7,707.91 for his loss. Birch demanded to be reimbursed for the 
remaining $25.00 of his deductible.12 Fire refused, and Birch sued.13 
The district court noted that Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,14 had held that 
"'[wjhere the insured settles with the tort-feasor, the settlement goes to the insured unless 
the insurer can prove that the insured has already received full compensation.'"15 The 
district court concluded that "Mr. Birch received full compensation for his tort damages 
in the amount of $475 representing 95% of his deductible. Mr. Birch was paid that 
amount and therefore has been made whole as to his tort damages under the reasoning 
9
 Dist. Ct. Minute Entry 1 n.l, R. 122 n.l (noting stipulation); Arg. Tr. 29. 
10
 Dist. Ct. Minute Entry 1 n.l, R. 122 n.l (noting stipulation). Arg. Tr. 17, 29-30. To 
the extent that the transcript is unclear, the district court's Minute Entry resolves the 
confusion. Birch alleges that the loss occurred on August 12, 2002, and his supporting 
memorandum to his motion for judgment on the pleadings attaches correspondence 
stating that the depreciation deduction was based on the fact that the fence was 
constructed in 2000. R. 49. 
11
 Birch Br. 2. 
12
 Birch Br. 2-3. 
13
 Birch Br. 3. 
14
 Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988). 
15
 Dist. Ct. Minute Entry 3, R. 124, quoting Hill, 765 P.2d at 868. 
4 
provided by the Court in Hill." Accordingly, the district court rendered summary 
judgment for Fire.17 The District Court, Judge Dever presiding, entered its Order (1) 
treating Birch's motion for judgment on the pleadings and Fire's response as cross 
motions for summary judgment and (2) granting Fire's motion and denying Birch's 
motion.18 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Birch has been made whole for his loss because he has been paid more than 
the full amount of the damages he could have recovered under tort law. 
II. Birch is not entitled to receive more than his proportionate share of the 
recovery to reimburse him for his deductible. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BIRCH HAS BEEN MADE WHOLE FOR HIS LOSS. 
"[F]ire insurance is only a contract of indemnity and its object is not to permit a 
gain by the insured but only to compensate him for a loss."19 The "principle of 
indemnity" dictates that insurance contracts "confer a benefit no greater than the loss 
1714 
18
 Order, R. 143-45. 
19
 Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Alberstadt, 383 Pa. 556,561, 119 A.2d 83, 86 (1956); Alberici v. 
Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 444 Pa. Super. 351, 359, 664 A.2d 110, 114 (1995). Cal. Ins. 
Code § 22 (1995) ("[insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify 
another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown event"); 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 1295, 77 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 296, 305 (1998) (in context of multiple insurance policies covering the same 
loss, "the insured's right of recovery is restricted to the actual amount of the loss."). 
5 
suffered by an insured." This principle is a fundamental doctrine of insurance law 
generally. The law of subrogation implements this principle by preventing double 
recovery for insured losses caused by tortfeasors. 
The indemnity principle ordinarily dictates deduction of depreciation in valuing 
losses: "If the principle of indemnity be adhered to, depreciation must be considered in 
loss adjustment so the insured will not receive the equivalent of a new building for a loss 
of the old one."21 Were insureds allowed to recover the full cost of a new building, rather 
than the value of the old one, they would receive windfalls, requiring inflation of 
premiums at the expense of other insureds. "In effect the insured sells his building not at 
its market value but at a much higher figure and for cash." 
But insurers do sell replacement cost insurance, for an extra premium. Such 
coverage goes beyond strict indemnity: 
The actual cash value policy is a pure indemnity contract. Its purpose is to 
make the insured whole but never to benefit him because a fire occurred. 
Replacement cost coverage, on the other hand, reimburses the insured for 
the full cost of repairs, if he repairs or rebuilds the building, even if that 
2U
 Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law § 3.1, at 135 (Prac. Ed. 1988); see 
also, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Interpretation of Insurance Contracts § 1.03 (2d 1999). 
21
 Note, Valuation and Measure of Recovery Under Fire Insurance Policies, 49 Colum. L. 
Rev. 818, 823 (1949). 
22
 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 353 (Ind. 1982). The law has 
long condemned policies providing for such windfalls, as opposed to merely 
compensating losses, as unlawful wagering agreements. Moving Picture Co. v. Scottish 
Union & Nat'l Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 358, 364, 90 A. 642, 644 (1914). 
6 
results in putting the insured in a better position than he was before the 
loss.23 
Replacement cost coverage is reconciled with the principle of indemnity because it 
responds to a different risk than the simple loss of value resulting from a fire. Limiting 
recovery to actual cash value: 
can and does leave uninsured a very real source of potential loss. A 
property owner may indeed realize a betterment through the reconstruction 
of a damaged building, but that betterment may be one for which he cannot 
at the time of loss afford to pay.24 
For purposes of this case, the important point to recognize is that replacement cost 
insurance goes beyond making the insured whole when the insured suffers damage to 
depreciated property. 
Tort law in contrast looks purely to indemnify against actual losses. Tortfeasors 
are required to provide full compensation for all damage to property that they tortiously 
cause.25 But where the property is depreciated by age, wear, or otherwise, the 
compensation required is the actual value of the property just before the damage, not its 
full replacement cost.26 
15
 Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 1982) (citations 
omitted). 
24
 Higginsv.Ins.Co.ofN.Am., 469 P.2d 766, 772 (Or. 1970). 
25
 Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (land); Winters v. Charles 
Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453, 454 (Utah 1978) (personal property). 
26
 Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) ("the measure of damages for permanent injury to real property is the 
difference between the market value of the property immediately before and immediately 
after the injury"). 
7 
Citing Marks v. Culmer, 6 Utah 419, 24 P. 528 (1890), Birch claims that the 
measure of damages "is ordinarily the cost of restoration or repair." (Birch Br. 6.) In 
fact, that is an alternate measure, used only if the cost of restoration is less than the 
diminution in market value. Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 
P.2d 475, 480 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) specifically addresses the issue of proper damages for land: 
Generally, the measure of damages for permanent injury to land is the 
difference in the market value of the land immediately before and 
immediately after the injury, but if the land may be resorted to its original 
condition, the cost of restoration may be used as the measure of damages if 
it does not exceed the diminution in the market value of the land. 
Ault, 739 P.2d at 1120 (emphasis added). Utah courts have also determined the proper 
measure of damages for injury to personal property is "based on the item's market value 
at the time of the taking or destruction." Winters v. Charles Anthony, Inc., 586 P.2d 453, 
454 (Utah 1978). That is fully consistent with the point in Marks v. Culmer, which was 
that the court had improperly permitted an award higher than the cost of replacement. 
In Hill, the Utah Supreme Court treated full tort compensation as the amount 
necessary to make the insured whole: "When the amount of damages incurred by the 
insured has been judicially ascertained, the extent of the subrogation right of the insurer 
is usually undisputed. The insured is not entitled to double recovery, and the insurer is 
entitled to recover any amounts from the insured that the insured recovered from the 
tortfeasor."27 Moreover, Hill relied on a Florida decision stating the point unequivocally: 
Hill, 765 P.2d at 866. 
8 
We consider that a party injured by an uninsured vehicle has received full 
compensation for his loss, within the meaning and application of the 
general principles [of equitable subrogation], when he has received full 
payment of a judgment... .2S 
The fact that full replacement cost is not recoverable in tort was precisely the 
reason that was given in Tampa Port Auth. v. M/V Duchess,29 for finding that the insured 
had been fully compensated by the admiralty judgment, even though the amount was less 
than the full cost of repair. The insurer had paid $390,355 and the insured $522,759 for 
the repair of the dock, but the judgment against the vessel was only $151,642. 
Nonetheless, the insured had been made whole, and the insurer was entitled to the entire 
recovery. The property was a "seriously deteriorated structure," and to award the insured 
the full cost of repair "would be an undeserved windfall."30 
Here, the depreciated value of Birch's property was $7,346.26. As the trial court 
correctly held, that was the amount necessary to make him whole for the loss and the 
most that could be recovered in tort. Birch argues that improvements to real estate do not 
depreciate, but add value. Even if true, this general observation would not alter the 
stipulated facts. But it is not true: fences and other improvements generally deteriorate 
over time and eventually require repair or replacement, even if they suffer no casualty. 
As a result, they typically become less valuable than similar new property. 
28
 Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Graff. 327 So. 2d 88, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), relied 
upon in FM1, 765 P.2d at 868. 
29
 Tampa Port Auth. v. M/V Duchess. 65 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1997). 
30
 Id at 1302. 
31
 Birch Br. 6 n.3 
9 
Birch has recovered $7,707.91 for his loss, including both insurance benefits 
($7,232.91) and subrogation reimbursement ($475.00). He has been made more than 
whole, as he has gotten property improved in value by $386.65, at a cost of only $25.00. 
Birch correctly points out that this logic, adopted by the district court, would 
indicate that he should have been reimbursed only $113.35, rather than $475.00.32 Quite 
so: Fire made a mistake and overpaid Birch. Fire seeks no recovery of the excess, but 
that mistake demonstrates that Birch has not only been made whole, but has been made 
much more than whole. The mistaken overpayment does not entitle Birch to an even 
greater payment. 
To be sure, Birch paid an extra premium for replacement cost coverage. In 
appropriate circumstances, that would entitle him to be made more than whole, based on 
the contract rather than the law of subrogation. But the contract must be read as a whole. 
The promised coverage is subject to a $500 deductible. So Birch must absorb costs up to 
$500 before being entitled to benefits for costs in excess of the depreciated value of the 
property. Here, in part because Fire has overpaid him, he has absorbed only $25.00. 
Birch has been made more than whole, and the limits on subrogation established in 
Hill have no application here. 
Birch Br. 6. 
10 
H. WHERE AVAILABLE ASSETS ARE AMPLE TO SATISFY ANY TORT 
CLAIM WITH RESPECT TO BIRCH'S LOSS, BIRCH IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO ALLOCATE A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE RECOVERY 
TO HIS DEDUCTIBLE. 
A. Hill Addressed the Allocation of Tort Proceeds Between Insurer and 
Insured When There Are Inadequate Assets to Provide Full Tort 
Compensation, a Problem Not Present in This Case. 
The leading Utah case on the handling of subrogation recoveries is Hill v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., a case where the assets available were inadequate to satisfy 
the tort claim. In that case, a car driven by Bryan fatally injured Caldwell's son and 
Hill's daughter and damaged Caldwell's car, in which they were riding. State Farm paid 
$5,510 to Caldwell for the damage to the car. When Bryan's insurer offered its $50,000 
policy limit in settlement of the tort claims, State Farm asserted its subrogation claim. 
Caldwell and Bryan sought waiver of State Farm's claim because the settlement amounts 
would not fully compensate them, but State Farm refused to waive. Bryan's insurer 
ultimately gave each parent a check for $22,245 and made a check for $5,510 payable 
jointly to Caldwell and State Farm. The Hill action sought to resolve the dispute over the 
latter check. 
The relevant policy language was not before the Hill court, and it noted that 
common law equitable subrogation doctrines could be modified if the contract so 
provided.34 
[b]ut in the absence of express terms to the contrary, the insured must be 
made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from a recovery 
33
 Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988). 
34
 Id at 866. 
11 
from the third-party tort-feasor. Noncontractual subrogation rights will 
only be enforced on behalf of a party maintaining a superior equitable 
position, and the insurer's equitable position cannot be superior to the 
insured's unless the insured has been completely compensated.35 
The court observed that, "when the amount of damages incurred by the insured has 
been judicially ascertained," 
[t]he insured is not entitled to double recovery, and the insurer is entitled to 
recover any amounts from the insured that the insured recovered from the 
tort-feasor. 
When the insured settles with the tort-feasor before the amount of 
damages has been judicially ascertained, it is more difficult to ascertain 
whether the insurer is entitled to recover all or any of the amount paid on 
the policy to the insured. 
Sometimes the issuance of a separate check with the insurer as a payee may reflect 
an allocation of the settlement to the amount paid by the insurer.37 In Hill, the check 
reflected only a dispute as to whether the amount had to be so allocated. Because the 
settlement released Bryan, it represented the full tort recovery that Caldwell would 
obtain, and State Farm argued that should be treated as full compensation. The court 
disagreed: 
"[m]any considerations enter into settlements. [The tort plaintiff] may have 
wished to avoid possibly protracted and frustrating legal battles; [plaintiff] 




 Id., citing Comment, Subrogation in Pennsylvania—Competing Interests of Insurers and 
Insureds in Settlements with Third-Party Tort Feasors, 56 Temp. L.Q. 667 (1983). The 
Comment says nothing that sheds light on our issue. 
37
 Id, citing Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783, 787 (Utah 1972). 
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pressured into the agreement for other reasons. Thus, the amount of the 
settlement and compensation may not adequately reflect the actual loss."38 
In Hill, Bryan was insolvent and the insurance was inadequate to cover the 
plausible amount of the tort claims. "Several courts have noted the importance of a tort-
feasor's solvency or adequacy of insurance . . . and will not allow an insurer to exercise a 
subrogation claim where the settlement was reached due to the tort-feasor's inability to 
fully compensate the insured." In light of these principles, the court announced a rule 
that: 
in the absence of specific contractual terms in either the release and 
settlement or the insurance policy, the insured must be made whole prior to 
any recovery by the insurer against the tort-feasor. When the insured settles 
with the tort-feasor, the settlement amount goes to the insured unless the 
insurer can prove the insured has already received full compensation.40 
As a result, State Farm could not recover unless it proved either that Caldwell had 
been fully compensated or that the release given by Caldwell had prevented State Farm 
from recovering its claim from Bryan. On the first alternative, it would be necessary to 
prove that "'the damages covered by [the insured's] settlement were the same or cover 
those for which the defendant had already received indemnity from [the insurer].'"41 
38
 Id at 867, quoting Janzen v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 67, 70 (Minn. 1979). 
39
 Id at 868, citing Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Graff, 327 So. 2d 88, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1976); Cooper v. Younkin, 339 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1983). Cooper says 
nothing that sheds light on our issue. Graff is discussed at n.55, infra. 
40
 Hill 765 P.2d at 868. 
41
 IcL at 868-69, quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d at 787. 
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Where, as in Hill, the insured has two distinct claims (one subrogated and one 
not), both of which may be satisfied out of a single fund, the insured may insist on 
application of the fund to satisfy the non-subrogated claim before the subrogated one can 
seek payment. But the children's insurance here was ample to pay the full amount of 
Birch's loss, subrogated or not. So that aspect of Hill does not matter here. 
Moreover, as previously shown, Birch has been fully compensated for his loss, 
even though, by replacing a depreciated fence with a new one, he has had to absorb a 
small part of the cost of improving his property. The Hill rule entitles him to nothing. 
B. The Focus of the "Made Whole" Inquiry Is Solely on Whether Those 
Payments Allocable to Insured Portions of the Loss Exceed Those 
Portions of the Loss, So That the Insured Would Get a Double 
Payment if Allowed to Retain the Full Tort Recovery. 
As Hill emphasized, "[t]he insured is not entitled to double recovery, and the 
insurer is entitled to recover any amounts from the insured that the insured recovered 
from the tort-feasor" with respect to the losses paid by the insurer.42 Thus, if a judgment 
determines the tortfeasor's liability for the insured losses or if the insured agrees to a 
settlement allocating an amount to the insured losses, the insurer is entitled to that portion 
of the tort recovery.43 
So, the focus of Hill is not on the adequacy of the insured's recovery generally, 
but on whether the insured has received a double recovery of any part of the loss paid by 
42
 Hill 765 P.2d at 866. 
43
 Id at 866, 868; Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d at 787 ("if the [tort] 
settlement were intended to include [the insurer's] prior medical expenses, two drafts 
should have been issued, one to [insurer and insured] jointly"). 
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the insurer. Thus, if part of the settlement is allocated specifically to the damages for 
which insurance benefits were paid, an insurer can obtain reimbursement for any 
recovery that makes the insured more than whole for those damages. This can be 
illustrated by varying the facts of Hill. Suppose that Bryan's policy had included $10,000 
in property damage liability coverage and $50,000 in bodily injury liability coverage. 
Caldwell could then have gotten $25,000 in wrongful death damages and $5,510 in 
property damage payments. Even if he would be inadequately compensated for the 
wrongful death, he would have received a double recovery for the damage to the auto. 
Under the principles set forth in Hill (and the predecessor Barnes case), State Farm 
should have been permitted full reimbursement on those facts. 
The reason for this rule is explained in Ludwig v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.44 
Farm Bureau had paid for Ludwig's medical expenses, and Ludwig had also been paid 
for these expenses through the settlement. But the trial court held that Ludwig had not 
been "made whole" because her claims for pain and suffering and disability had not been 
fully paid.45 The appellate court reversed, holding that "the amounts recovered against a 
third party for separate elements of a claim can be identified and credited toward 
subrogation claims, even though other elements of the third-party claim may not be fully 
satisfied."46 The purpose of subrogation is to prevent unjust enrichment of one party at 
the expense of another, the court noted, and Farm Bureau did not agree to indemnify 
44
 Ludwig v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 143 (Iowa 1986). 
45
 Id at 145. 
46
 Id at 146. 
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Ludwig for pain and suffering or for disability. Yet, denial of Farm Bureau's claim for 
medical expenses because Ludwig had not also recovered for other elements of damage 
"would have the effect of making [Farm Bureau] an insurer against those losses as 
Accordingly, Fire is entitled to retain all portions of the tort recovery properly 
allocated to the insured portion of Birch's loss. Even if Birch were treated as having a 
total loss equal to the replacement cost of the fence, he would still not be entitled to any 
portion of the tort recovery allocable to the portion of the loss that exceeded the 
deductible: he has already received full compensation from Fire for the portion 
exceeding the deductible. Determining that amount would require application of the 
proper rules for allocation of tort recoveries. 
C. Where a Settlement Does Not Allocate the Recovery Between Insured 
and Uninsured Losses or Where a Non-Settling Party Does Not 
Consent to the Allocation in the Settlement, a Court Must Determine 
the Allocation for Purposes of Subrogation. 
Hill stated the "made whole" rule as applied to a settlement where a non-settling 
insurer has not agreed to any allocation: [W]hen the insured settles with the tort-feasor, 
4 /IdLatl47. 
48
 Id Accord Ortiz v. Great Southern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d 342, 343-44 
(Tex. 1980) (if any portion of the amount recovered from the tortfeasor is intended as 
compensation for damage to the insured property, for which damage the insurer has 
already made payment, insurer is entitled to subrogation "to the extent that the sum of 
insurance collected plus the amount allocated in the settlement agreement" to the 
property damage exceeds the insured's covered loss), relied upon in Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. 
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 949 P.2d 337, 346 (Utah 1997); Voss v. Mike & 
Tony's Steak House, 230 So. 2d 470, 472 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (unified settlement of 
$2100 for both insured and uninsured losses allows insurer to recover its payments for 
damage to auto; settlement held tortfeasor harmless from subrogation claims). 
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the settlement amount goes to the insured unless the insurer can prove the insured has 
already received full compensation."49 Clearly, where the settlement itself makes no 
allocation, a court must determine the allocation. But even if the settlement purports to 
make an allocation, that should not be binding on a nonparty to the settlement. The 
tortfeasor may be indifferent as to the allocation, so making the agreement control would 
allow insureds to allocate the entire recovery to uninsured losses, thereby subverting the 
rule that the insurer is not obliged to subordinate its own claims to provide extra 
compensation for uninsured losses. Accordingly, Hill allows an insurer to prove that 
some part of the recovery should be allocated to losses for which the insured has obtained 
full recovery.50 
The same rule was applied in Dimick v. Lewis,51 where an insurer had paid a 
child's medical expenses and was subrogated to the parent's claim for those expenses, but 
not to child's claims for other damages. While the insurer's payments totaled 
$43,423.26, the settlement allocated only $1,996 to the subrogated claim. The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court directed the trial court to make independent evaluation of 
losses incurred and allocate the recovery: 
The plaintiffs . . . cannot jeopardize the insurer's position by making a 
unified claim for insured and uninsured losses and then unilaterally allocate 
4yHiil,765P.2dat868. 
50
 AccordTransamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783, 787 (Utah 1972) (remanding 
for court to allocate settlement). 
51
 Dimick v. Lewis, 497 A.2d 1221 (N.H. 1985). 
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only a small portion of the settlement to the parents in order to frustrate the 
insurer's rights.52 
Of course, this is not a case where the insured settled or in which the settlement 
even purports to allocate the proceeds between insured and uninsured losses. But Birch 
surely can be no better off in this case than he would have been had he himself settled 
and purported to allocate the first $500 in settlement proceeds to payment of his 
deductible. Fire submits that the stipulated facts establish that such an allocation would 
be improper, even if Birch were regarded as having a loss equal to the replacement cost 
of the damaged property. 
D. Where Available Assets Are Adequate, the Insured Cannot Properly 
Allocate to Uninsured Losses More Than the Fair Value of the Tort 
Claim Attributable to the Uninsured Losses, Considered Alone, 
So long as a settlement is not influenced by the adequacy of assets available to 
satisfy any judgment, the settlement can be treated as a fair prediction of the result that 
would be obtained by taking the case to trial. That, in turn should allow pro ration of the 
distribution between the insured and uninsured claims. Where the tort claims themselves 
have weaknesses, the fund may not be exhausted even by full payment of the non-
subrogated tort claim. If the insured is adjudicated to have 20% of the fault and the 
^ Id at 1224; Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc. v. MacGregor, 368 N.E.2d 1376 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) 
(court determined allocation of settlement and allowed insurer to recover medical 
expenses it had paid); Davenport v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 404 P.2d 10 (Nev. 
1965) (court allocated settlement not allocated by parties to allow insurer's subrogation 
claim); Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 158 N.E. 60 (N.Y. 1927) (though parties did not 
allocate settlement, if amount attributed to insured property damage could be determined, 
subrogation would be allowed); Mattson ex rel. Mattson v. Stone, 648 P.2d 929 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1982) (trial court found that settlement included medical expense, making 
insured whole for that expense and allowed insurer's subrogation claim); Scales v. Skagit 
County Med. Bureau., 491 P.2d 1338 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (same). 
18 
tortfeasor the rest, the insured can never recover more than 80% of the non-subrogated 
loss itself. If that 80% recovery does not exhaust the available insurance or assets, any 
additional recovery must be allocable to the subrogated claim (Le. losses paid by the 
insurer), and the insurer can receive reimbursement even though some of the insured's 
other damages are not recoverable from any source. 
This point is supported by Hill, which states that the amount constituting full 
compensation in any adjudicated tort recovery will be the amount awarded by the court.53 
Other courts agree.54 
Similar logic would apply to a settlement for 80% of the full claim based on a 20% 
chance that a jury would find no liability. This explains the rule adopted in Gov't 
Employees Ins. Co. v. Graff.55 GEICO paid $10,000 in uninsured motorist benefits to its 
insured, Stokely. Stokely's lawyer, Graff, obtained a settlement of $25,000 from the 
United States. Graff deducted $2,000 for his fees before offering to pay $8,000 to 
GEICO. GEICO had informed Graff that it would pursue its own claim against the 
United States and insisted that it was not obliged to bear any cost for his services. Graff 
and Stokely resisted GEICO's suit by arguing that Stokely's full damages were more than 
$35,000, and the GEICO was not entitled to any reimbursement, because Stokely had not 
53
 Hill 765 R2d at 866. 
54
 Tampa Port Auth. v. M/V Duchess, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301-02 (M.D. Fla. 1997) 
(litigated judgment against wrongdoer conclusively establishes amount necessary to 
make insured whole; collecting cases on the point). 
55
 Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Graff. 327 So. 2d 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), relied 
upon in Hill, 765 P.2d at 868. 
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been fully compensated. The Florida court held that Stokely had been fully compensated 
as a matter of law: 
We consider that a party injured by an uninsured vehicle has received full 
compensation for his loss, within the meaning and application of the 
general principles [of equitable subrogation], when he has received full 
payment of a judgment or an agreed settlement which was unaffected by 
concern for the defendant's lack of insurance.56 
While the Florida Court justified its result partially on the ground that uninsured 
motorist insurance was not designed to make the insured better off than if the tortfeasor 
had been adequately insured, it relied on subrogation principles developed in other 
contexts and it has been treated as applicable to other types of insurance.58 At least some 
other courts have come to similar conclusions as to the effect of an insured's settlement 
in fixing the amount necessary to provide full compensation.59 
Id. at 91 (emphasis added). Graff was, however, entitled to compensation for the 
expense of creating the common fund from which the subrogation recovery was drawn. 
Id at 91-92. 
57IdLat91. 
58
 Florida Farm Bur. Ins. Co. v. Martin, 377 So. 2d 827, 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) 
(fire insurance claim; subrogation not permissible because tort claim settled for policy 
limit rather than full value). 
59
 E.g., Thompson v. Fed. Express Corp., 809 F. Supp. 950, 954 (M.D. Ga. 1992) 
(settlement for $3.1 million conclusively established full compensation and permitted 
benefit plan to recover in subrogation, even though injured employee's expert would 
testify to damages of $4 million); Associated Hosp. Serv. v. Pustilnik, 396 A.2d 1332 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 439 A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1981) (subrogor's 
settlement against public utility conclusively establishes value of tort claim and entitles 
subrogee to participate in the recovery); Leader Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Torres, 779 P.2d 722, 
726 (Wash. 1989) (absent showing of inadequate assets, settlement deemed full 
compensation, because it "represents what the case was worth to the insured without 
having to endure a trial"; subrogated insurer entitled to pursue tortfeasor because latter 
knew of subrogated claim when settling with the insured); see also Erie Ins. Co. v. 
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This Court need not decide whether to adopt the Graff rule that settlements 
unaffected by concern about adequacy of assets should be considered full compensation. 
Here, it is stipulated that the settlement was a reasonable approximation of the tort 
I 
damages recoverable, with no concern for either asset adequacy or any possible 
weaknesses in the tort claim. Because the fair value of the tort claim was only 95% of 
the "loss," no more than a proportionate share of that value could be allocated to Birch's 
deductible. Even absent the stipulation, the arms-length settlement between adverse 
parties might give rise to a presumption requiring Birch to prove a higher value for the 
tort claim or Fire to prove a lower value. But, given the stipulation, Birch is entitled to 
allocate to the deductible portion of the loss no more than 95% of the deductible amount, 
or $475.00. Because he has already received that amount, he is entitled to no more.60 
Kaltenbach, 720 N.E.2d 597, 600-01 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (where insurer paid medical 
expenses of $5000 and insured, over insurer's objection, accepted a tort settlement of 
$4462, insured fully compensated; also holding that interference with subrogation right 
rendered full compensation rule inapplicable and that policy language entitled insurer to 
be made whole before insured could recover). 
60
 Even if Birch was not being made whole, Fire recovered a common fund for the benefit 
of both itself and Birch. Had Fire incurred costs in making that recovery, Fire would 
have been entitled to charge Birch with a proportional share of those costs. 
Parties and attorneys who bear the burden of producing a common fund for the benefit 
of others are generally entitled to impress a charge on the entire fund, including the 
shares of the others, for the cost of producing the fund. Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. 
Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 n.17 (Utah 1994) (recognizing existence of the rule but 
finding it not applicable; applying related common benefit rule). See Trustees v. 
Greenough,105 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1881); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus. 113 U.S. 
116, 127 (1885); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 163 (1939). Thesecases 
are the root of the common-fund fees doctrine, as that doctrine is followed in American 
jurisdictions. John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees from 
Funds, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1597 (1974). 
Many courts have applied this principle to subrogation recoveries, ordinarily to require 
the insurance company to bear a portion of the cost incurred by the insured to obtain the 
21 
E. Because Fire Does Not Seek to Alter the Rule Provided by the Common 
Law of Subrogation, It Matters Not That the Insurance Department 
Opposes Contractual Alteration; Moreover, the Department Supports 
the Sort of Allocation Made Here. 
Birch points to an Insurance Department Bulletin to support his claim. That 
Bulletin was addressed to a problem not involved here. Hill says that the common-law 
rule it announces would be inapplicable if the contract between the parties provided 
otherwise.61 Some insurers have sought approval for policy language overriding the Hill 
rule, but the Department has refused to approve such language: 
It is not in the best interests of Utah insureds to allow language that limits 
their ability to be made whole.... It is understood that the insured is not 
entitled to double recovery, but his initial recovery, to the fullest extent 
possible, should come before the insurer.... To allow a policyholder to 
believe that his insurer has an unconstrained right to unidentified (as to 
element of damages) proceeds of a settlement would be inequitable . . . . 
Fire does not seek to avoid the Hill rule. Rather, Fire seeks a proper application of 
that rule. Moreover, the Insurance Department itself has construed Hill in the same way 
tort recovery from which the insurer was reimbursed. See The Common Fund Doctrine: 
Coming of Age in the Law of Insurance Subrogation, 31 Ind. L. Rev 313 (1998). This 
application has been noted in some Utah cases. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 
P.2d 783, 785 (Utah 1972) (subrogated insurer sought reimbursement "less a reasonable 
attorney's fee and its proportionate share of the costs of the fund recovered by [the 
insured] from the tort-feasors") has been approved by the Insurance Department, which 
has adopted a regulation limiting its use in auto physical damage claims. R590-190-11(5) 
("No deduction for expenses can be made from the deductible recovery unless an outside 
attorney is retained to collect such recovery. The deductions may then be only for a pro 
rata share of allocated loss adjustment expense."). The rule is not directly applicable 
here, because this is not an auto physical damage claim. 
61
 Hill, 765 P.2d at 866. 
62
 Utah Ins. Dept Bulletin 96-9 (Frequent Problems Found in Filings: Disability Lines). 
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Fire advocates. It has adopted a rule governing subrogation recoveries with respect to 
auto physical damage claims which provides: 
(5) Insurers shall include the first party claimant's deductible, if any, in 
subrogation demands initiated by the insurer. Subrogation recoveries may 
be shared on a proportionate basis with the first-party claimant when an 
agreement is reached for less than the full amount of the loss, unless the 
deductible amount has been otherwise recovered. The recovery shall be 
applied first to reimburse the first party claimant for the amount or share of 
the deductible when the full amount or share of the deductible has been 
recovered.63 
The third sentence recognizes the priority of the insured's claims when the 
available assets are inadequate, while the second sentence recognizes that insurer and 
insured are equally and proportionately affected by weaknesses in the tort claim (e.g. 
fault allocable to the insured or problems of proving liability). While the regulation is not 
directly applicable to this homeowners' insurance claim, it demonstrates that the 
I 
Insurance Department does not read Utah's insurance laws to impose requirements 
i 
inconsistent with the position advocated by Fire. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons stated above, the judgment should be affirmed. 
63
 R590-190-11(5) (Standards for Prompt, Fair and Equitable Settlements Applicable to 
Automobile Insurance). 
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